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Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical 
solution when auctioneers pursue more than one 
objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. 
However, it is difficult to achieve auction efficiency 
with multiple award criteria. Using auction data 
from road and railway concessions in Latin America, 
the probability of renegotiation this paper estimates 
by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary 
selection in the first-stage regression. The findings show 
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that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional 
format when the need for social considerations, such as 
alleviation of unemployment, is high. This implies that 
such political considerations could hinder efficiency and 
transparency in auctions. The analysis also shows that the 
renegotiation risk in infrastructure concessions increases 
when multidimensional auctions are used. Rather, good 
governance, particularly anti-corruption policies, can 
mitigate the renegotiation problem.  
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Multidimensional auctions seem like a natural solution in practice, when 
auctioneers, governments in the context of this paper, pursue more than one objective in 
their auctions. In both theory and practice, however, whether multidimensional auctions 
improve the efficiency of the outcomes remains open to argument. Part of the problem 
stems from the fact that when multiple criteria are adopted to select a winning bidder, a 
difficult question to answer is how to aggregate those criteria in the bid evaluation 
process.  
The issue is not only important but also quite current because auctions are 
becoming a common instrument to contract out public services to private operators under 
the public-private partnership (PPP) framework adopted by many developed and 
developing countries. Because PPP transactions are usually valuable, complicated and 
closely related to living standards of people, the authorities are induced to take advantage 
of the multidimensional format in designing PPP-related auctions. They generally want to 
enhance the service provision with a reasonable quality at the lowest costs. Here the 
objectives are already threefold. Simultaneously, governments may want to require more 
investment in advanced technology from operators. Often, in addition, governments also 
wish to protect employment of public enterprises being sold and limit staff reductions. 
Some of these objectives are inherently incompatible with every other objective in 
the wish list of auctioneers. Any objective which increases costs, such as new investment 
requirements or minimum employment levels, can become a threat to the affordability of 
prices. This implies that the multiplicity of objectives can represent a risk from a social 
viewpoint. However, without appropriate investment, the quality of services cannot be 
improved which can also have a social cost. Similarly, if private operators are required to 
hire extra employees, the efficiency gains needed to cut costs and hence tariffs have only 
a limited scope, restricting the potential social payoffs of the PPPs.  
As often happens, the challenges are in the implementation details for these 
auctions. Basic auction theory indicates several risks of implementing multidimensional 
auctions. This paper explores a set of possible necessary conditions to implement 
multidimensional auctions successfully. Using data on auctions for road and railway 
  1concessions in Latin America, the impact of adopting multiple award criteria is estimated 
by a two-stage least squares technique with a binary probability selection in the first-
stage regression. The results indicate that multidimensionality could increase the 
likelihood of ex post renegotiation, which is considered an indication of possible auction 
design flaws. It also shows why a stringent anti-corruption policy and sound regulatory 
framework are important to improve effectiveness of multidimensional auctions. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief survey of the literature 
on multidimensional auction design. Section 3 summarizes the data available on auction 
design in transport PPP in Latin America. Section 4 looks at multidimensional auctions in 
practice.  Section 5 presents the model we rely on for our analysis. Section 6 discusses 
the estimation results and their policy implications. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. A QUICK REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON MULTIDIMENSIONAL  AUCTION DESIGN  
 
Regardless of its potentially large implications for the real auctions, there has 
been little development in multidimensional auction theory; it is far from conclusive on 
how to design an efficient auction in the multidimensional context—more precisely how 
to weight more than one criterion involved. In theory, “quality” bids represent anything 
the auctioneer cares about—such as environmental and social consideration, technical 
reliability, and trustworthiness of contractors—other than bid prices.  
There are only a few distinguished theoretical models in this area. In a pioneer 
study, Che (1993) shows that design competition is more important than price 
competition in auctions for highly heterogeneous goods or services, such as weapon 
systems for national defense. It finds that the first- and second-quality-score rules 
implement the optimal mechanism that maximizes the expected profits for the auctioneer, 
if bidders are required to submit both price and quality bids under the assumption that 
quality is costly for bidders and correlated with their private cost parameters. It also 
shows that the optimal scoring rule systematically induces a downward distortion of 
quality from the first-best level. To achieve the optimality, it is essential for the 
auctioneer to ex ante commit to the scoring rule.  
  2A typical multidimensional auction format is the two-stage bid evaluation system, 
such as prequalification and the two-envelope procedure. These are widely used in public 
procurement. Under standard pre-qualification procedures for the selection of large-scale 
civil works contractors, the criteria relate primarily to general financial and technical 
competence of potential bidders before inviting bids. In addition, the more detailed 
technical evaluation of proposed specifications often takes place before the price 
competition. In theory, however, Cripps and Ireland (1994) show that separating the price 
competition from the quality qualification makes no difference; the results are the same 
regardless of whether quality or price is first examined, or even simultaneously. On the 
other hand, with firm preferences (e.g., costs) affiliated, the optimal mechanism would be 
a two-stage first- or second-score approach where in the first stage the auctioneer chooses 
the best bidder in terms of the score, and then negotiates with the selected firm to extract 
the optimal quality (Branco, 1997).  
In practice, a clear shortcoming of multidimensional auctions is that the award 
process tends to be less transparent and more vulnerable to corruption. In 
multidimensional auctions, it is easy for the authorities to exploit their excessive 
discretion (Klein,  1998). Because of this, prospect firms are normally motivated to 
influence the auctioneer’s decision on award criteria. As the result, there would likely be 
various interactions between politicians and lobbying firms before calling for bids.
1 An 
auction model indicates that if a corrupt agent has large manipulation power, bribery 
makes it costly for the truly efficient bidder to secure a win; the efficient firm will lose 
the contract with positive probability (Burguet and Che, 2004).  
Empirically, Cabizza and De Fraja (1998) find that in a multidimensional auction 
with a few bidders, there is a systematic risk of awarding the object to an inefficient 
bidder. However, it is also found that this adverse selection can be mitigated when a 
number of bidders participate in the auction. Notably, a discretionary technical and 
experiential evaluation may jeopardize the transparent nature inherent to auctions. For 
                                                 
1 In the railway industry, for instance, it is a common sense that if the evaluation rule has a preference to the diesel 
locomotive system, European railroad companies would have relative advantage. On the other hand, with more 
importance attached to the electric train system, Japanese railroad companies may have the advantage. As the result, 
both parties involved have a strong incentive to influence the government decision of the technical evaluation method.  
  3example, too restrictive pre-requirements are always questionable from the corruption 
perspective (Ware et al., 2007).  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that a well-designed multidimensional auction 
might be conducive to excluding prospect firms and consortia having insufficient 
technical and financial capacity to implement the agreed contract. The main reason for 
the public system requiring the prequalification process is that prequalification is 
expected to help to examine the reliability of prospective bidders on the basis of their 
experience, human and physical resources, and financial positions. In addition, through 
the prequalification process the public agencies can assess the potential interest from 
qualified firms and save the amount of work and time in evaluating bids from unqualified 
contractors (ADB, 2006).  
Significantly, in PPP infrastructure transactions many contracts have been 
renegotiated within about two years after their awards (Guasch, 2004). About 30 percent 
of concessions granted in the Latin American and Caribbean region during 1985–2000 
underwent renegotiation. Why does renegotiation so often take place, regardless of 
careful preparations for PPP transactions during several years?  
There are a number of reasons for this phenomenon. First, auction theory suggests 
that if bidders are asymmetry—i.e., either weak or strong—a weaker (fringe) bidder tends 
to bid more aggressively in the presence of a strong (incumbent) bidder (Maskin and 
Rileys, 2000). Their proposition is supported by the evidence in the road construction 
auctions (De Silva et al., 2002, 2003). This bidder asymmetry may partly explain such 
frequent renegotiations. This is the case when private operators are turned out too 
optimistic about the demand forecast for undertaken services. In the context of road 
concessions, fringe contractors may tend to overestimate the future traffic; however, 
lower-than expected traffic would easily make them go into bankruptcy.   
Second, given the expected hold-up problem of auctioneers, bidders may have a 
strong incentive to submit unrealistic low bids, which is referred to as “low balling” 
(Ware et al., 2007). This strategic behavior must of necessity result in an increase in 
renegotiation.  
Finally, the other alleged reason is a failure in designing the multidimensional 
evaluation framework to select the most efficient firm. In the PPP infrastructure context, 
  4a variety of criteria have been used to allocate infrastructure concessions, such as the 
minimum tariff, minimum duration of concession, minimum subsidy, highest payment to 
the government, and largest investment value criterion (e.g., Kerf, 1998). While 60 
percent of concessions awarded based on the lowest tariff criterion were renegotiated, 11 
percent of contracts granted on a highest-payment basis underwent renegotiation 
(Guasch, 2004).  
It remains inconclusive whether the impact of adopting more than one criterion on 
the incidence of renegotiation. In Guasch’s (2004) regressions, the coefficient associated 
with multi-criteria auctions is almost always insignificant. The results may or may not be 
reasonable given the expected positive and negative impacts as mentioned above. The 
current paper readdresses this question by performing an endogenous selection model 
with data on concession auctions in the road and railway sectors. It cannot be 
overemphasized that the adoption of multidimensional award criteria is an endogenous 
variable, which is affected by not only project characteristics but also governance and 
social circumstances, such as prevalent poverty, inequality and unemployment. This point 
is not controlled for in Guasch (2004).  
 
3. PPP  IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND AUCTION DESIGN  
 
Since the 1990s the private sector has invested 180 billion U.S. dollars in 
transport infrastructure (airports, railroads, roads and seaports) of developing countries 
(Figure 1). The total number of private participation transactions recorded reaches about 
1,000 by 2006. About 30 billion U.S. dollars flowed in these sectors for 2006 alone. By 
region, Latin America is the leading region, having 40 percent of total transactions. By 
(sub)sector, the majority are road projects, followed by the railroad sector. In terms of the 
amount of investment, the road and railroad sectors amount to 47 percent and 20 percent 




                                                 
2 In terms of the number of transactions, the road-sector is still dominant, having 48 percent. However, the second 
largest area is seaports (30 percent). The railroad-sector private involvement accounts for 10 percent.  
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In road-sector private participation, concession contracts and greenfield projects 
are two typical types of private sector participation (Table 1). Most road transactions aim 
to contract out highway construction, operation and maintenance for 20–30 years. For 
railroads, the private sector’s experience has concentrated on concessions in Latin 
America (Table 2). There are a certain amount of divestiture experiences, such as partial 
freight privatization in Chile and Jamaica, partial passenger railway privatization in 
China, and full passenger privatization in Estonia. But these are relatively minor cases. 
Many Central and Eastern Europe countries have adopted some short-term private sector 
management, but the contracts last less than one year and are not clearly separated from 
government fiscal operations (Toet, 2007).  
 







East Asia & Pacific 0 84 82 18 184
Europe & Central Asia 0 2 7 0 9
Latin America & the Caribbean 6 53 120 0 179
Middle East & North Africa 0 1 0 0 1
S o u t h  A s i a 23 25 9 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 3 3 0 10















East Asia and Pacific 1 12 0 3 16
Europe and Central Asia 2 0 0 4 6
Latin America and the Caribbea 02 4 83
Middle East and North Africa 0 0 1 0 1
South Asia 0 2 1 0 3
Sub-Saharan Africa 4 3 12 0 19




Our sample does not cover all these transactions but originally includes 131 road-
sector projects and 37 railroad contracts for 11 countries in the Latin America and the 
Caribbean region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Some of them are not used for our analytical 
work because of missing data. In our sample some road contracts cover over 1,000 km of 
roads for operation. There is a tendency that countries having more experiences of private 
sector involvement in this area, such as Argentina and Brazil, would likely deal with 
larger-scale of transactions (Figure 2). It can be interpreted to mean that countries need to 
be experienced in contractual affairs.  
Railroad contracts are generally enormous. The average contract size for 
passenger services is about 500 km. On the other hand, freight service concessions 
involve 3,000 km on average (Table 3). The largest contract is the Ferrocarril Pacifico-
Norte Project in Mexico undertaken by Grupo Ferroviario Mexicano (Ferromex), which 
covers 8,000 km of railway network. But rail-sector contracts are commonly large in 
other countries, e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.  
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Freight 22 2,910 2,327 184 8,029
Passenger (intercity, local) 9 484 773 35 2,270 
 
Partially due to this scale effect, the transport sector seems to face with some 
serious problems of effectiveness of PPP contracts. Guasch (2004) shows that 
renegotiation was especially common in transportation concessions (Table 4). Our 
sample is broadly consistent with his results; the renegotiation rate is 57 percent of total 
road concessions. Renegotiation is less likely to occur in railroads; the probability is 
estimated at 32 percent.  
 








   Roads 57.3
   Railroads 32.3
Water & sanitation 74.4
Incidence             
(% of total contracts)
 
Sources: Guasch (2004); and authors’ calculation. 
 
One possible reason for frequent renegotiation in the transport sector is a lack of 
competitive nature. The degree of competition for transport is normally relatively limited 
compared with energy and telecommunications. The other reason is that the transport 
sector might involve greater uncertainty beyond the reasonable assumptions accounted 
for in the contract. For instance, the demand forecasts for road traffic may be 
systematically more difficult those for electricity. It could also be attributed to the 
possibility that transport transactions might be more vulnerable to corruption and 
collusion, which would materialize as a renegotiation incidence.  
However, the most fundamental issue is that it should take long time for private 
operators to be motivated to invest in infrastructure (i.e., network) and recover their 
investments with sufficient revenues. During the long contract periods many exogenous 
and endogenous factors would change. Interestingly, however, the rail franchising 
experience in U.K.—which is a pioneer in this area—shows that aggregate revenue 
  8growth for all three major segments exceeded the revenue projections set at the bidding 
stage (Kain, 2007). Thus, the reason for renegotiation is not always that bidders were too 
optimistic about the future demand. But Kain also mentions that the operating cost 
increase was also greater than expected. Nash and Smith (2007) also show that wage 
increases in the passenger rail sector after the private sector involvement were in sharp 
contrast to the bus industry where wages sharply fell.  
In our sample, the reason for relegation in Colombian road concessions was 
mainly the deficits of concessionaires, which caused by higher-than expected costs and 
lower-than-expected traffic. Many road contracts in Mexico for the 1990s were affected 
by the currency crisis. In some cases, more-than-expected investment requirements 
triggered off renegotiation. In Brazilian road concessions, redefined investment plans 
were the main reason for renegotiation. Investment requirements are in general one of the 
most powerful determinants of renegotiation; the renegotiation rate is 70 percent where 
any investment commitments are stipulated in the contracts (Guasch, 2004). Unexpected 
tariff changes also ruined financial viability of private operators. Argentina typically had 
the same tariff problem. In the railway sector, lower-than-expected demand and 
suppressed tariffs are two common reasons.  
Given these problems anticipated, governments are naturally motivated to 
introduce some auction mechanisms to rein renegotiation in the future. An example is 
multidimensional auctions. In our sample, about 20 percent of concession auctions in the 
road and railway sectors applied more than one criterion to award the contracts 
(Figure 3).
3 The road-sector concessions are less likely to use the multidimensional 
format than the railway sector. This is intuitively reasonable, because road concessions 
are relatively simple and there are a larger number of prospect firms who are qualified for 
the provision of road operation and maintenance services. Therefore, through intensified 
competition at the auction stage the authorities can expect high efficiency in service 
delegation even under a simple award mechanism. About 95 percent of road concessions 
adopted a single criterion method, mostly the lowest tariff rule in our sample. It is 
followed by the minimum duration and highest canon criteria.  
                                                 
3 Our sample includes 106 transactions in eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Uruguay.  















































Note: The numbers of observations are shown in parentheses.
 
 
By contrast, more than 30 percent of railroad concessions adopted the multiple 
criteria award rule. Presumably, the design for railway concessions may be more 
complicated, because the possibility of horizontal unbundling is much limited in 
railroads. Even if some routes—typically in rural areas—are non-profitable for private 
operators, the railway system needs to be kept bundled to take advantage of network 
economies on a much broad basis. For the same reason, despite private participation a 
number of projects continue dependent on government compensation of losses. Even 
after 10 years of experience in U.K.—including several setbacks such as a security 
problem raised by the 2000 Hatfield accident and several bankruptcies and 
renegotiations—most passenger train operators still need subsidies (Nash and Smith, 
2007). 
Any auction mechanism has both advantages and disadvantages. Multiple award 
criteria will generate wasteful rent seeking and lobbying for arbitrary selection of 
winners. On the other hand, a single criteria rule makes little sense when several policy 
objectives need to be taken into account. However, notably, auction competition tends to 
be limited in the infrastructure sector. It is obvious that transparency is essential in 
auctions and too many requirements i.e., criteria, might reduce transparency and 
discourage potential bidders from participating in the bidding process, diminishing 
competition. Particularly in the rail industry, competition has been very limited even 
under fairly open circumstances for entrants (Alexandersson and Hultén, 2007). In our 
sample, the average number of bidders participating in competition for railway contracts 
  10is only 2.2 (Figure 4). For road concessions, we can expect more participants; it ranges 
mostly from 2 to 7 bidders per auction with an average of 3.4 (Figure 5).
4  
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4. MULTIDIMENSIONAL AUCTION PRACTICES IN INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
Infrastructure development usually has multiple objectives; the authorities are 
keen to increase the quantity of services and improve the quality as well. From the social 
point of view, at the same time, they might desire to ensure affordability for services, 
especially in developing countries. The governments may also have an intention to 
                                                 
4 It is noteworthy that this competition effect is not involved in the following analysis, because it is considered—in 
theory—irrelevant to our analytical framework where the multidimensional auction decision and the likelihood of 
renegotiation are examined. The auction design, including multidimensionality, is given at the bidding stage, and 
renegotiation is not directly affected by how many firms participated in the prior bidding process. In our sample, the 
simple correlation coefficients between renegotiation incidence and the number of bidders are low at 0.22 for rail and 
0.05 for roads concessions.  
  11reduce their budgetary expenses through spinning off their public infrastructure 
operations. On top of that, in many developing countries the public sector is among the 
largest employers in the economy. If this is the case, the authorities, mainly politicians, 
are likely to be sensitive to a possible reduction in employment after the contracts.  
A stylized fact about general private participation in infrastructure may be that the 
network size (such as connections) tends to be enhanced and the unit operating cost 
would likely decline. Private management also increases labor productivity (such as 
delivered services per employee). This improvement typically stems from retrenchment 
in excess employees. The quality of services would also improve. Tariffs may or may not 
increase.
5 Gassner et al. (2007) also shows that the improved performance of electricity 
(and water) utilities involving private sector participation is largely associated with an 
increase in labor productivity. In railways, the Estonian divestiture experience where a 
national railway company was vertically unbundled and privatized indicates that labor 
strength has reduced by 37 percent and labor productivity increased dramatically. It 
became four times as high as that of the EU countries (World Bank, 2006).  
As far as transport concessions are concerned, this employment effect may be a 
crucial issue to implement PPP transactions successfully. State-owned railway companies 
usually absorb a large number of employees. Under these conditions, the number of firms 
participating in the bidding process is expected to be small. Then, the governments would 
become even more cautious about other project aspects than prices. In our sample, about 
32 percent of railway sector concessions relied on multidimensional auctions, possibly to 
accomplish more than one policy objectives simultaneously. 
As per Estache et al. (2002), in the Argentine railway freight concessions during 
the 1990s, the winning bid was selected based on the weighted score of future 
investment, staff accession and service quality. It is pointed out that the inclusion of the 
staff transfer criterion was clearly a political compromise. In the U.K. experience, Nash 
and Smith (2007) indicate a similar concern; wage increases in the passenger rail sector 
after the private sector involvement were in sharp contrast to the bus industry where 
wages sharply fell.  
                                                 
5 For instance, the benchmarking data for the electricity distribution sector in LAC 1995-2005, 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/lacelectricity/home.htm  
  12A key question to be asked is this: Why do the authorities decide to use the 
multidimensional format? Given that decision, what is the quantitative impact of 
introducing multiple evaluation criteria on the incidence of renegotiation?  
An important factor which should be accounted for to answer those questions is 
governance. This is because one of the clear shortcomings of multidimensional auctions 
is that including various types of bids to be evaluated would endanger transparency and 
public credibility—especially when adopted criteria are contradictory to each other and 
the auctioneer cannot pre-commit to the prior agreed evaluation rule. Whether the multi-
criteria method can choose the most efficient firm is dependent on some elements of 
public governance, such as government effectiveness (i.e., the quality of public services 
and the competence of civil servants), regulatory soundness and anti-corruption policies. 
Without good governance, multidimensional auctions are highly likely to fail.  
Particular attention is also paid to employment. If unemployment is high and the 
public enterprise to be sold is the employment center in the economy, it is highly likely 
that politicians would require the evaluation system to include an employment criterion, 
which is based on the number of retained workers after the transaction is concluded. 
Whether or not to have the ability to protect auction efficiency and transparency from 
political interferences is again dependent on public governance.  
The Swedish spectrum right case—though it did not take the competitive bidding 
format—clearly shows the difficulty and lack of transparency in evaluating multiple bids. 
The reason for the authorities’ decision not to use the auction format was that they 
wanted to pursue multiple objectives, such as more investment, broader coverage, faster 
transmission speeds and further technological development (Andersson et al., 2005). As 
demonstrated in Table 5, however, the awarding decision is very sensitive to the weight 
attached to individual factors. Suppose that bidders were ranked by each of these major 
criteria and the rankings are equally weighted. Then, Europolitan, HI3G Access, 
Mobility4Sweeden and Orange Sweden would have been awarded. If 
Mobility4Sweeden—which was in reality disqualified due to its financial 
irresponsiveness—is excluded, Tele2 would be additionally selected. This result is the 
same as the government selection. Nonetheless, suppose that only the three criteria used 
for the second stage evaluation are adopted. Then, the award result would change, again. 
  13With reason the government decision was actually contested in court, by Reach Out 
Mobile, Telia, and Telenordia.  
 
Table 5. Multiple Criteria in Swedish Beauty Contest for 3G Licenses 
Decision Decision
Ranking Decision Ranking Decision
Broadwave communications AB 4,700 14.7 32,750 81 09/2002 6.8 6.3
Europolitan AB 20,000 27.5 Qualified 165,259 100 01/2001 Awarded 2.8 x 3.3
HI3G Access AB 20,814 36.9 Qualified 224,724 100 01/2002 Awarded 2.8 x 4.0
Mobility4Sweden AB 8,760 15.3 395,520 100 01/2002 3.2 x 2.3 x
Orange Sweden AB 8,635 19.7 Qualified 364,528 100 08/2001 Awarded 2.8 x 2.0 x
Reach Out Mobile AB 5,238 15.8 259,944 100 04/2001 4.6 2.7 x
Tele 2 AB 10,186 17.7 Qualified 112,666 100 10/2001 Awarded 4.2 4.7
Telenordia Mobil AB 7,200 14.0 Qualified 181,346 98 01/2002 5.8 4.7
Telia AB 4,100 6.8 308,661 100 01/2002 5.8 3.0 x
Tenora networks AB 7,550 11.2 290,038 100 01/2002 5.0 3.3
Source: Andersson et al. (2005); and author's calculation. 






























Guasch (2004) also describes a similar story in the context of Guatemalan mobile 
telecommunications auctions. The award decision was based on the new technology 
development, area coverage and payment to the government. In the first evaluation, the 
winning firm was not an entity incorporated. The authorities seem to have changed the 
evaluation method, given the winning firm’s financial and operational uncertainty of the 
firm. But the second highest bidder was not selected in the second round evaluation 
(Table 6); the reason remains unclear. The top two losers filed lawsuits.  
 









Guacel 69.01 85.46 x




Source: Guasch (2004).   
 
Another example is provided by Torta (2005), which investigates an Italian new 
highway (Brescia-Milan) contract. It is found that the implied construction cost to obtain 
a single point of construction period might be overestimated. In this case, there were only 
two bidders. Two criteria were dropped from the originally announced list. This is 
  14already a violation against the theoretical proposition that pre-commitment to the scoring 
rule is important to implement the optimal mechanism. Five criteria were used for 
evaluation: tariff level, concession period, construction period, return, and revenue 
transfer quota to the government (Table 7). A one-month advance of the delivery of the 
infrastructure seems too costly compared with the total expected construction period of 
four years.  
 
Table 7. Weights on Multiple Criteria in Brescia–Milan Toll Road Auction 
Original Revised
Operation procedure  20
Technical evaluation 12
Tariff level 18 26 10–15
Concession period (year) 16 24 30–40
Construction period (month) 15 22 2–3
Economic return 10 15 …
Revenue transfer quota 9 13 …
100 100
Source: Torta (2005). 
Implied cost 





These episodes are sufficient to realize the fragility of multidimensional auctions 
against ambiguity of evaluation weights and political interventions. Transparency in 
setting and assessing requirements is essential. It is not recommendable that too many 
dimensions are used as evaluation criteria. They will create more room for rent-seeking 
activities, whence corruption and collusion. If necessary, auction theory may support the 
two-stage approach with a few criteria. However, note that how to evaluate those criteria 
should be predetermined before inviting bids (Che, 1993). Ex post adjustments would be 
especially inappropriate. Therefore, good governance and sound government policies are 
required to implement multidimensional auctions successfully.  
 
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA  
 
To estimate the impact of multidimensional auctions on renegotiation, the 
following two-stage least squares technique is employed (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002). The 
basic reason is that the decision of whether or not to use a multiple criteria rule is 
endogenous in the sense that the multidimensional format might be selected in particular 
auctions with certain unobserved characteristics, which would in turn affect the 
  15possibility of renegotiation. Our two-stage technique follows the treatment effect model 
with a binary probability selection in the first-stage regression:  
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where DRENEG is a dummy variable for the incidence of renegotiation. DMULTI is a binary 
variable for the adoption of the multidimensional format, which is potentially an 
endogenous variable in Equation (1). It is the government policy decision based on 
project characteristics, social circumstances and the degree of governance, all of which 
are included in Z. The likelihood of renegotiation is assumed dependent on the award 
criteria decision and other control variables in X.  
The ordinary regression (e.g., probit) of Equation (1) of primary interest would 
generate an unbiased estimate of the multidimensional auction effect, γ, if there was no 
correlation between the decision, DMULTI, and the disturbances  1 ε . This conceptually 
requires that a complete set of factors determining the likelihood of renegotiation could 
be included in determinants X. However, this is not likely in our data, because many 
institutional factors are not perfectly observable by econometrician, such as governance 
and tacit collusion. The typical concession contracts which were awarded through the 
multiple criteria method might be more (or less) likely to be renegotiated regardless of 
the selected auction design.
6 Therefore, the first-stage regression in Equation (2) aims at 
identifying possible determinants of auction formats. Given the predicted probability of 
multidimensionality  , Equation (1) of interest can be estimated as the second 
regression. This is expected to provide an unbiased estimate of γ.  
MULTI D ˆ
The determinants of multidimensionality choice include the rate of 
unemployment, governance indices and project characteristics. The unemployment rate is 
                                                 
6 As will be seen, in fact, the ordinary probit with the endogeneity of the auction format ignored generated a stronger 
effect on renegotiation incidence. This can be interpreted to mean that endogeneity matters.  
  16supposed to capture the need of some—though certainly not all—social considerations 
from the political point of view.
7 High unemployment is likely to induce the authorities 
to adopt multiple criteria to take various social aspects into account. Our sample includes 
eight countries in Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru and Uruguay. Note that Figure 6 reflects the average unemployment rates from 1990 
to 2000. However, in our following regression analysis the unemployment variable is 
time-variant. Because there are annual unemployment data available, it has a variation 
among transactions in each country.
8 Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Mexico had relatively 
low unemployment rates; thus, these countries are supposed to have less incentive to 
employ the multidimensional auction format, holding other conditions constant.  
 









Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay
Source: World Development Indicators.
 
 
Three governance indices are borrowed from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI): government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and control of 
corruption. These measures are deemed particularly relevant to the infrastructure 
concession contracts. First, to select a set of award criteria and evaluate them effectively, 
                                                 
7 One might think that it is too much simplified to make the unemployment rate represent all socio-economic issues 
behind the government’ multidimensionality choice. Alternatively, the Gini coefficient may represent the degree of 
inequality in the economy, and the poverty headcount ratio may indicate the extent to which the governments should 
account for social impacts for the poor in proceeding with the PPP infrastructure transactions. However, these variables 
are not available for every year; thus they can only capture their country-level effect that is identical over time.  
8 From the econometric point of view, the advantage of using this time-variant variable is that we can identify the 
unemployment impact separately from other country-specific characteristics, such as governance indices, or even 
country-specific unobservables. A disadvantage may be the government decision on whether or not to use the 
multidimensional rule might not be so sensitive to annual changes in unemployment rates. However, suppose that a 
government desires to contract out a rail freight operation when the unemployment rate is 12 percent. The government 
would be more concerned about the employment reduction plans of prospect private operators than the case where it 
could auction the transaction under the unemployment of 1-2 percent, holding other conditions constant.  
  17the quality of public services and the competence of civil servants—both of which are 
measured by the government effectiveness index—need to be high. Second, the 
infrastructure sector is highly regulated, and thus a sound regulatory framework is 
essential. Finally, anti-corruption policies may play an important role to prevent potential 
political interference when the multidimensional format is adopted.  
Unlike the unemployment variable, the governance indices are time-invariant 
country-specific variables, because it is reasonable to consider that it takes long time to 
improve governance. In fact, there is little variation in the governance variables over 
time. Since our sample covers transactions concluded from 1989 to 1999, the WGI in 
1996 are used.  
Among our sample countries, Chile is the best performer in terms of governance 
(Figure 7). Brazil, Colombia and Mexico may suffer from a severe corruption problem. 
But the government effectiveness of Colombia is not necessarily unacceptable at least by 
regional standards. The quality of regulation in Mexico is relatively high in our sample. 
In general, nonetheless, all the sample countries, except Chile, have a relatively weak 
governance structure by global standards. In that sense, they may risk failing the PPP 
concessions with multiple award criteria, because of lack of governance.  
Figure 7. Governance Indices in 1996 













Source: World Governance Indicators.
 
Three variables control for heterogeneity among transactions: length of roads 
(km), total length of tracks (km), and duration of concession (year). These are contract-
specific. Obviously, given a transaction, either road length or track length must be zero; 
there is no transactions covering both sectors.  
  18In the second stage regression (Equation (1)), these three contract-specific project 
characteristics are included in X. The governance indices are also included, because 
governance affects not only the award criteria selection but also the possibility that either 
party involved would call for renegotiation. DMULTI  is replaced with the predicted 
probability given by Equation (2).  
Table 8 summarizes the dependent and independent variables in our sample. It 
contains 106 concession transactions in the road and railway industries. The contract size 
differs considerably. The average size of road concessions is about 190 km with the 
maximum of over 1,200 km. Some railway concessions involve 8,000 km of tracks in 
total. The duration of concession varies from 8 to 40 years. Table 9 shows simple 
correlation between variables in our model.  
Table 8. Summary Statistics 
No. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
D RENEG 106 0.50 0.50 0 1
D MULTI 106 0.21 0.41 0 1
Road length (km) 106 189.97 259.80 0.00 1234.00
Track length (km) 106 645.07 1581.95 0.00 8029.00
Contract duration (year) 106 22.02 6.88 8.00 40.00
Unemployment (percent) 106 7.62 3.51 2.10 20.00
Govt effectiveness 106 0.17 0.42 -0.27 0.95
Regulatory quality 106 0.73 0.30 0.39 1.30
Control of corruption 106 0.01 0.58 -0.94 1.29
Memorandum items: 
Country dummy
Argentina 106 0.28 0.45 0 1
Bolivia 106 0.02 0.14 0 1
Brazil 106 0.30 0.46 0 1
Chile 106 0.16 0.37 0 1
Colombia 106 0.03 0.17 0 1
Mexico 106 0.16 0.37 0 1
Peru 106 0.03 0.17 0 1
Uruguay 106 0.02 0.14 0 1
Sector dummy
Roads 106 0.71 0.46 0 1
Railway 106 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Table 9. Simple Correlation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(1) D RENEG 1
(2) D MULTI -0.08 1
(3) Road length (km) 0.44 -0.27 1
(4) Track length (km) 0.00 -0.04 -0.14 1
(5) Contract duration (year) -0.19 -0.26 -0.22 0.38 1
(6) Unemployment (percent) 0.10 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 1
(7) Govt effectiveness -0.03 0.27 0.10 -0.11 -0.14 0.13 1
(8) Regulatory quality -0.12 0.21 0.06 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 0.94 1
(9) Control of corruption -0.15 0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 0.76 0.81 1
(10) Argentina 0.48 -0.07 0.37 0.10 -0.15 0.39 0.27 0.18 -0.06 1
(11) Bolivia -0.09 -0.11 -0.07 0.06 0.23 -0.13 -0.03 0.06 -0.21 -0.07 1
(12) Brazil 0.07 -0.39 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.09 -0.56 -0.60 -0.07 -0.23 -0.07 1
(13) Chile -0.23 0.14 0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13 0.82 0.86 0.96 -0.18 -0.06 -0.19 1
(14) Colombia -0.02 0.34 -0.16 -0.09 -0.05 0.46 0.08 -0.18 -0.29 -0.19 -0.06 -0.20 -0.16 1
(15) Mexico -0.23 0.10 -0.27 -0.05 -0.04 -0.64 -0.34 -0.16 -0.33 -0.31 -0.09 -0.33 -0.26 -0.27 1
(16) Peru -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.15 0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 1
(17) Uruguay -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.06 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.01 
 
  196. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
Four models are performed by the two-stage least-squares method; the first stage 
probit results are shown in Table 10. This essentially reveals why the governments 
decided to use the multidimensional auction format in their PPP transactions. As 
expected, higher unemployment is strongly associated with the decision to adopt multiple 
award criteria. It means that auctioneers are using the multidimensional format to respond 
to the need for social considerations. This evidence can be interpreted as a risk of 
jeopardizing auction efficiency due to political compromise.  
On the other hand, there is no evidence that multidimensional auctions would be 
preferred under more corrupt circumstances. Such a worst-case scenario is not true in our 
estimation results. Rather, the governments are more likely to take advantage of multiple 
criteria when the government effectiveness and the quality of regulation are high. This 
may reflect the fact that without effective and sound government systems it would be 
impossible to manage multidimensional auctions for contracting out PPP infrastructure 
transactions.  
 
Table 10. First Stage Probit of Multidimensional Auction Selection Equation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Road length  -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0016

















(0.0483) (0.0456) (0.0394) (0.0498)













(1.9660) (1.9913) (0.7891) (2.6609)
Obs. 106 106 106 106
Wald test statistics 29.17 33.39 25.69 22.99
Pseudo R-squared 0.4972 0.4893 0.4764 0.4969
Note: The dependent variable is the binary variable for the multidimensional auction 
selection. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
In terms of project characteristics, the total length of tracks is among the 
significant determinant of the award design decision (in the railway sector). The 
  20governments prefer to adopt the multidimensional set-up as the size of transaction 
increases. It is reasonable that many other factors than prices—e.g., employment and 
investment in rural areas—would likely matter in the case of large-scale railway 
concessions.  
With endogeneity controlled for as mentioned above, we find that the selection of 
multidimensional auctions increases the possibility of renegotiation. Table 11 presents 
the second stage regression results. It indicates why renegotiation happened or under 
what circumstances renegotiation tends to take place. The coefficient of the predicted 
probability of choosing multidimensional auctions is positive and significant. It means 
that the authorities are motivated to adopt the multidimensional format for certain reasons 
(as discussed above), but they are likely to fail in benefiting from the potential effects of 
multidimensional auctions, whence resulting in more renegotiation events. This is 
consistent with a number of episodes highlighting the real difficulty in managing 
multidimensionality.  
The table also shows that several elements of governance are important to reduce 
the likelihood of renegotiation. Anti-corruption policies are found particularly powerful. 
The corruption control index has a significant negative coefficient. A sound regulatory 
environment may also be useful to mitigate the renegotiation risk. Meanwhile, the 
probability of renegotiation increases with the size of project in the road sector. Large-
scale road concessions are more likely to undergo contractual adjustments in due course.  
 
 
Table 11. 2SLS Estimation of Renegotiation Equation 
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )




(0.00021) (0.00022) (0.00023) (0.00018)
Track length -0.00004 0.00003 -0.00006
* -0.00004






(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0082)
Govt effectiveness 0.3303 0.8342
* -0.1315
(0.4485) (0.4395) (0.2517)
Regulatory quality -0.4738 -1.1963
** -0.0748
(0.5839) (0.5483) (0.3056)















(0.4205) (0.3702) (0.2401) (0.2507)
Obs. 106 106 106 106
F statistics 33.80 15.37 37.01 37.52
R-squared 0.3833 0.4412 0.4040 0.4089
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for the incidence of 
renegotiation. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
MULTI D
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Regardless of potential endogeneity associated with the criteria selection, the 
simple probit model is performed; the results are shown in Table 12. The main results are 
broadly unchanged, but the coefficient of the dummy variable for multidimensional 
auctions is considerably greater that the baseline estimates in Table 11. Because of 
endogeneity, the simple probit coefficient is considered upward biased. Nonetheless, the 
basic implication still holds that applying the multidimensional mode would increase a 
risk of renegotiation and anti-corruption measures could mitigate such a risk.  
 
Table 12. Simple Probit Estimation of Renegotiation Equation 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
















(0.0293) (0.0199) (0.0267) (0.0261)
Govt effectiveness -1.1320 -0.3597 -0.4268
(2.0238) (1.1329) (0.6141)
Regulatory quality 1.0815 -1.6088 -0.4186
(2.8335) (1.5981) (0.8489)










(1.6694) (0.3928) (1.7825) (1.9440)
Constant -0.6219 1.4124 -0.0678 0.1531
(1.6651) (1.1071) (0.7049) (0.8784)
Obs. 124 124 124 124
Wald test statistics 33.94 27.19 29.96 28.66
Pseudo R-squared 0.4220 0.1706 0.4208 0.4194
Note: The dependent variable is the dummy variable for the incidence of 
renegotiation. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
One remaining empirical concern may be that the unemployment proxy could not 
capture the socio-economic and political conditions related to the auction design decision 
in infrastructure concession contracts. One might think that heterogeneity among 
countries would be underestimated in our model and that unobservable country-specific 
characteristics could overwhelm the effect of unemployment. Table 13 shows the 
estimated first stage selection model with different socio-economic proxies, which are 
country-specific in our data. The unemployment rate is only the statistically significant 
determinant; the Gini coefficient and poverty headcount ratio (US$1 per day) have been 
found insignificant.  
  22Moreover, the unemployment rate still remains significant and positive, even 
when country heterogeneity is controlled for at the more general level. The last two 
column models employ the country dummy variables, instead of country-specific 
observables; Chile is used as a baseline. The results indicate that country-specific 
unobservables have a considerable explanatory power for the multidimensionality choice. 
The estimated coefficient is significantly different from the baseline country, Chile. 
Colombia is the least likely to use multidimensional auctions, followed by Uruguay and 
Brazil. If the probit model is applied, the number of valid observations significantly 
drops.
9 However, the positive coefficient still remains significant, and Chile is most 
likely to employ the multi-criteria rule in road and railway concessions. 
The estimated country dummy coefficients in Table 13 are broadly consistent 
with our unemployment measurement (Figure 6) and some of the governance indices 
(Figure 7), although they do not perfectly correspond to one another. It means that the 
unemployment rate may misrepresent the whole picture of socio-economic conditions in 
the individual economies, but it is still a valid proxy to a certain extent.  
The policy implication is straightforward; auctioneers tend to make use of 
multiple award criteria when PPP infrastructure transactions are sizable and their 
administrative and regulatory capability is sufficient. At the same time, however, the 
adoption of multidimensional auctions is inspired by the need for social considerations, 
particularly from the employment point of view. If such political intervention erodes 
auction efficiency and transparency, the risks of the failure in infrastructure concessions 
will be enormous. The past data suggest that the multidimensional format increases the 
incidence of renegotiation. In other words, it seems much difficult to implement efficient 
multidimensional auctions.  
This is consistent with some tentative propositions of the existing auction theory. 
Auction theory indicates that it is always controversial how to evaluate many dimensions 
included. Probably, the two-stage approach with a few criteria is optimally 
implementable under certain circumstances. The strong pre-commitment to the evaluation 
                                                 
9 For technical reasons, the probit model is estimated with data from only three countries (i.e., Argentina, 
Chile and Peru). In our sample, five countries have no variation in the dependent variable, DMULTI; for these 
countries, the probability of adopting the multidimensional auction format is perfectly predictable.   
  23method is required prior to the auction. Consistently, our estimation results show that 
good governance is a key to help mitigate the renegotiation risk.  
 
 













































Obs. 123 123 54
F statistics 8.25 ...
R-squared 0.3790 0.4079
Wald test statistics 7.32
Pseudo R-squared 0.1152
Note: The dependent variable is the binary variable for the multidimensional 
auction selection. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** 
and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS  
 
Multidimensional auctions are a natural and practical solution when auctioneers 
pursue more than one objective in their PPP-related transactions. Both in theory and 
practice, however, it seems difficult to achieve auction efficiency with multiple award 
criteria.  
With auction data on road and railway concessions in Latin America, the paper 
aimed to estimate the impact of adopting the multidimensional format by a two-stage 
least squares technique with a binary selection in the first-stage regression. One of the 
  24important empirical features is that the government decision of award criteria is 
endogenous.  
We find that that auctioneers tend to rely on the multiple criteria format when 
there is greater need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment. It 
can be interpreted as a potential risk that such political considerations could reduce 
auction efficiency and transparency. In fact, we also show that the risk of renegotiation of 
infrastructure concession contracts increases when the multidimensional evaluation 
format is adopted.  
Despite the general difficulty to implement multidimensional auctions in an 
efficient manner, good governance has an important role to play in reducing the 
likelihood of renegotiation. In particular, we find that anti-corruption policies are a 
powerful instrument for avoiding renegotiation. To put it the other way around, a corrupt 
economy would have more frequent renegotiation incidence even if the concession 
contracts are concluded through multidimensional auctions.  
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